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ABSTRACT
The terrorist attacks of September 1 1 th 2001 on New York and Washington DC
shed light on the many security shortcomings that sea ports and the entire import and
export process face. A primary source of these problems is the information sharing
process which makes it hard to track the source of a problem in the import and export
process due to lack of information and coordination. This thesis attempts to examine
these data sharing problems by looking at what federal agencies, ports, and other private
firms have been doing to solve the problems. The document exchange between various
stakeholders and the process behind that was also examined to find potential problems.
The reason behind doing this is because it is essential to understand the process and its
problems before any meaningful results can be extracted from examining the efforts
being done to solve the problems. The findings were similar for all cases showing that the
primary reason preventing any of these problems to be solved is the unwillingness of
commercial stakeholders to share information due to lack of incentives and privacy
concerns.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Hauke Kite-Powell
Title: Lecturer
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
1.1 - PURPOSE
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. in 2001 brought to the
surface with them many vulnerabilities in the flow of international cargo through all
modes of transportation. However, the other modes such as air-traffic, had aspects that
were straightforward to identify and upgrade (although requiring significant funding).
Since 96 percent of all overseas imports to the US are by sea, it is obvious that an
important area of improvement is port security, and anything that is connected to it,
which are other modes such as truck and rail as well.
The US government initiated many programs for various funding to US ports, in
order to alleviate some of their security shortcomings. However, most of these funds
were dedicated towards the repair of fencing, adding patrol boats, and other
unsophisticated measures. The real problems however, are not how to prevent
unauthorized entry. In case of a terrorist attack using hazardous chemicals or bombs, it is
not of much use to prevent people from entering the port, when the container with the
bomb is already in port, which is often near a metropolitan area. More efforts have to be
placed on the information aspect of security, which is the most effective way of
preventing a "bad" container from ever entering the country.
Some ports and other private firms have decided to follow up on this, by
developing systems to capture data being shared between stakeholders in the process, in
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an attempt to make the flow more visible and a threat more readily detectable.
Government agencies such as the US Coast Guard and US Customs have placed
emphasis on data issues as well by performing demonstrations, and implementing several
measures to improve security and efficiency of the cargo flow. The focus for both
government agencies and ports has been placed on containerized cargo and passenger
vessels, which are less of a commodity and harder to control compared to liquid and dry
tankers.
The objective of this thesis is to examine the information technology of port
security as outlined above, by examining these efforts by ports and government agencies
to remove some of the inherent vulnerabilities from the system by trying to manage the
data flow, primarily for containerized cargo.
Prior to examining these ports and their efforts, however, it is essential to know
what information is actually being exchanged. The basic information flow required prior
to a ship's entry in port has to be examined in order to see what is currently being
exchanged, and where some of the potential problems could lie. However, since the
import and export of a container does not start and end from when a container is loaded
onto the ship to when it is unloaded, the entire intermodal chain of information and
stakeholders also has to be examined in detail to find other vulnerabilities in the data
exchange.
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1.2 - CONTENT DESCRIPTION
As mentioned above, this thesis will examine the data being exchanged between
stakeholders in the intermodal process of exporting and importing a container. The next
chapter starts with some basic background on ports, and what some of the major ports
have done since 9/11. I will focus on an approach taken by some ports to collect and
manage large amounts of cargo movement-related data (A separate approach would be to
communicate specific pieces of this data rather than to collect and manage it; please refer
to the thesis by Alexander Sichel on Supply Chain Security and Information Technology
for further information on this approach). Apart from the ports, efforts by the US Coast
Guard to evaluate and improve security issues will be examined as well, through the
results of a nationwide demonstration involving US ports and threat assessment tests.
The third chapter examines the documentation that a ship has to send prior to or
during arrival in port. Some of these documents, however, rely greatly on the "goodwill"
of the ship's captain or operating firm to send accurate information. Therefore, each of
these documents is described in detail.
The fourth chapter discusses the information being exchanged in a grander scale,
involving the entire intermodal process of exporting a container from beginning to end, in
order to find possible vulnerabilities and areas of improvement. All the data being
exchanged among stakeholders in chronological order are examined, as well as the roles
and responsibilities of each of these stakeholders.
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The fifth chapter examines the information technology systems that have been
developed by ports with government funding, or private firms, in order to find common
weaknesses and strengths that other ports or private firms could use when developing
such systems. The final chapter summarizes the findings in each of the previous chapters
and puts these together in order to provide a set of recommendations for future
improvements to the export and import process and the security of ports, primarily
through the improvement of data exchange and visibility.
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CHAPTER 2 - Background on Ports and Security
2.1 - US PORTS BACKGROUND
As usual, for any major development or technological change to take place in the
maritime field, a major event has to bring certain vulnerabilities to light. For the tanker
industry, the change from single hull to double hull standards was rushed due to the
Exxon Valdez grounding (along with other tanker accidents), creating OPA '90
regulations. Today, major changes are being driven by the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington D.C on September l t h, 2001, which has brought to light the major
vulnerabilities of US domestic and international ports, which are an integral part of a
much larger global transportation system.
Ports are inherently vulnerable due to several factors. The great amount of volume
being transported through these ports makes them an easy avenue for terrorist attacks.
From 2000 to 2020, container growth is expected to more than double. Container ships
have grown from 2000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit) to 10000 TEUs in the past
three decades. Over 95 percent of all US overseas cargo passes through these ports'.
These trends have led many ports to be thinking about expanding in land size or
dredging, in order to handle this growth. Their extensive size and easy access by land and
water make it difficult to implement security measures that can, for example, be applied
to airports. The vicinity of many ports to metropolitan areas poses another serious threat.
Process for Reporting Lessons Learnedfrom Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. United States
Government Accountability Office, January 2005
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Oil tank farms, hazardous material storage, and other facilities are often located near
urban life, roads, bridges, factories, etc. This also leads to the intermodal aspect, since
combining so many different modes such as rail and roads, and the handling of people,
high value cargo, and hazardous material, make ports lucrative targets for terrorist
activities. These vulnerabilities are a result of ports inadequacy to handle the increasing
vessels, cargo, and people flowing through. Drugs and illegal aliens are smuggled
routinely into the US hidden between legitimate cargoes aboard large commercial vessels
due to these vulnerabilities, and can easily be exploited by terrorists to stage their attacks.
However, besides the impact such a terrorist attack can have on the well being of
many people living in the vicinity of ports and on the environment, they can result in
devastating economic impact. The Brookings Institute estimated that in 2002, a weapon
of mass destruction shipped my mail could result in losses reaching as much as one
trillion dollars 2. In 2002, a simulation of a terrorist attack involving containers, included
having every seaport being shut down, which resulted in a $58 billion loss in revenue to
3the US economy, not including the effects on the international economy .
2 Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis by Michael E. O'Hanlon et al., Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
3 Systems Engineering Approach to Analysis of the United States Critical Infrastructure and US Ports as
Subsystems of the Extended Enterprise System. Susan Vandiver, Southern Methodist University, 2005
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2.2 - US PORT SECURITY MEASURES
Due to the aforementioned vulnerabilities, ports have been forced to upgrade their
security measures. However, the role of port authorities have been different from port to
port, due to different sizes, current situation, funding availability, and managing position.
What I mean by managing position is whether a port acts as a landlord or operator port. A
landlord port is a port where the port has minimal effect on how each terminal is run,
which is left up to the separate terminal operators. This means that the port authority will
typically not take it upon itself to implement any complicated and expensive security
measures that would affect operations within a terminal. Operator ports are the opposite,
since their philosophy is that they are in charge of the port and will take it upon their
duties to implement measures beyond the minimum requirements, which will hopefully
simultaneously improve the services they offer by improving efficiency. The trend has
been for the major ports, such as LA and Long Beach to act as landlord ports, and smaller
ports to be operator ports. Exhibit 2.1 shows the top US ports and their landlord or
operator stance. This positioning of each port is one factor affecting the different levels of
security measures between ports, along with the amount of funding received by each port
authority.
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EXHIBIT 2.1
U.S. PUBLIC PORT OPERATING STATUS
Landlord Operating LimitedOperating
Alabama State Port Authority x
Albany, Port of x
Anchorage, Port of x
Beaumont, Port of x
Bellingham, Port of x
Bridgeport Port Authority x
Brownsville, Port of x
Canaveral Port Authority x
Cleveland-Cuyahoga County Port Authority x
Coos Bay, Port of x
Corpus Christi Authority, Port of x
Detroit/Wayne County Port Authority x
Duluth Seaway Port Authority x
Everett, Port of x
Freeport, Port of x
Galveston, Port of x
Georgia Ports Authority x
Grays Harbor, Port of x
Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission x
Greater LaFourche Port Commission x
Green Bay, Port of x
Guam, Port Authority of x
Hawaii DOT, Harbors Division x
Houston Authority, Port of x
Humboldt Bay Harbor District x
Iberia,Port of x
Indiana Port Commission x
Jackson County Port Authority/Port of
Pascagoula
Jacksonville Port Authority x
Kalama, Port of x
Lake Charles Habor & Terminal District x
Long Beach, Port of x
Longview, Port of x
Los Angeles, Port of x
Manatee County Port Authority x
Maryland Port Administration x
Massachusetts Port Authority x
Miami, Port of x
Milwaukee, Port of x
Mississippi State Port Authority, Gulfport x
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Landlord Operating Limited
Operating
New Orleans, Port of x
New York/New Jersey, Port Authority of x
North Carolina State Ports Authority x
Oakland, Port of x
Olympia, Port of x
Orange, Port of x
Oswego Authority, Port of x
Oxnard Harbor District/Port Hueneme x
Palm Beach District, Port of x
Panama City Port authority x
Pensacola, Port of x
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority x
Plaquimines Port, Harbor & Terminal District x
Port Angeles, Port of x
Port Arthur, Port of x
Port Everglades x
Port Lavaca-Point Comfort, Port of x
Portland (OR), Port of x
Puerto Rico Ports Authority x
Redwood City, Port of x
Richmond (VA), Port of x
Sacramento, Port of x
San Diego Unified Port District x
San Francisco, Port of x
Seattle, Port of x
Shreveport-Bossier, Port of x
South Carolina Ports Authority x
South Jersey Port Corporation x
South Louisiana, Port of x
St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal District x
Stockton, Port of x
Tacoma, Port of x
Tampa Port Authority x
Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority x
Vancouver (WA), Port of x
Virginia Port Authority x
Wilmington (DE), Port of x
Source: AAPA
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For many of the smaller ports and some of the major ports acting as landlord
ports, security within the terminals is not a major issue. Therefore, some of these ports
focus only on perimeter security using government grants for this purpose. According to
the results of a 1999 survey conducted by the American Association of Port Authorities
(AAPA), the top 5 issues for many US and some international ports were as follows:
1. Facility expansion/modernization
2. Ability to secure funding/financing
3. Pricing pressures and new revenue sources
4. Environmental regulation
5. Railroad and highway intermodal access
Security and information technology is quite a bit lower on the list of important issues for
ports (although this survey was done before September 11, 2001). Also, commercial
stakeholders such as ocean carriers and shippers are not always interested in security in
and of itself. If they are not being adequately compensated for spending funds to improve
security, by faster service, etc, they will usually not have the incentive to do more than
the bare minimum required by federal agencies. Therefore, for a port to be more willing
to implement security measures and be more proactive, the measures should have both
security and commercial benefits.
The security measures that were implemented range from simplistic to complex.
The simple ones range from fencing, to patrol boats. Some more complex measures are
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closed circuit television (CCTV) systems and x-ray or gamma-ray container content
inspection. Few of the major landlord ports have already tried to implement, successfully
or not, complete information tracking systems, which can result in efficiency
enhancement. These information systems are described in detail in chapter 5. Most of the
current and future technology measures implemented by US ports are the following:
* Fencing
* Lighting
" CCTV
" Access control
" Sonar/Radar
* Biometrics
" RFID
" Chemical and Biological Weapons Screening
* High Tech Patrol Boats
" Thermal Imaging
" Explosive Material Detection
* Radiation Screening
* Ballast Water Management
* Data Integrity
" Command Centers
" Cargo Tracking
* Security Planning/Management
" Tie-in to Federal/Local Law Enforcement
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Although government agencies may be satisfied by the implementation of some
these measures, most of them are not very substantive. The primary reason for this is that
most of the ports lack a systems engineering approach. Most ports, especially the
landlord ports, spent the available funds for the basic measures such as patrol boats,
which is what funding was primarily provided for. Intrusion prevention is not the major
terrorist source. If the weapon of mass destruction or hazardous chemical has already
entered the port area, preventing trespassing will not do much to prevent a major disaster.
Some ports for example have placed dozens of radiation detection portals (x- and
gamma-ray). However, this large investment is still inadequate, since a well shielded
nuclear device can easily go undetected, and having these detection portals in place can
result in over-confidence, and actually result in worse results than more thorough
inspection to suspicious containers. Similarly, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification),
although it seems like a great technology, has some problems. The technology is not too
reliable yet, and even if it were, for it to be effective, an ocean carrier would need to have
all of their thousands of containers outfitted with the technology. This could be a very big
investment which could possibly overshadow any benefits. I believe that more focus
should be placed on detecting such threats and preventing them from entering US ports in
the first place. To do this, the major ports have attempted to implement container tracking
and other technologies, as part of a more comprehensive information tracking system, in
order to help have more visibility throughout the shipping process and its intermodal
connections.
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2.3 - US FEDERAL AGENCY MEASURES
Apart from what the ports have done, federal agencies have also scaled up their
operations. The US Coast Guard, Customs, INS, and others, try to ensure that vessels,
workers, passengers, and cargo, comply with US laws. Also, agencies such as the TSA
and the Department of Defense try to ensure that the infrastructure is safe from terrorist
attacks.
Some of the important actions taken by the Coast Guard have been to conduct
initial port risk assessments, redeployed assets, scaling up of surveillance of high-interest
vessels, laid out groundwork for comprehensive security planning, and in general have
been driving changes in security worldwide. The initial risk assessments were undertaken
to identify the needs for each of the ports, and ranged from simple tasks such as the need
to replace bad fencing to more complex. These assessments done by Coast Guard
personnel (or their representatives) were also used to estimate the need for funding for
each port. Similar vulnerability assessments were done by ports in order to identify the
most common vulnerabilities and establish common standards. The redeployed vessels
were Coast Guard cutters which were moved from offshore operations such as drug
patrols, immigration, and fisheries monitoring, and were moved to port regions.
Similarly, high-interest operations such as passenger and LNG vessels also had
surveillance scaled up.
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The US Customs have also stepped up their operations by inspecting containers
using x-ray or gamma-ray imaging portals. However, as already mentioned, these
systems are not that reliable due to the overconfidence factor. Therefore, Customs have
adapted their computer systems to more effectively pin-point containers for inspection.
This system was originally designed for the Customs narcotics efforts, and uses data from
submitted forms to identify potential threats. This philosophy is similar to that of the
information systems discussed in chapter 5. The agency has also started pre-screening
cargo, by establishing operations for inspections in countries such as Canada and France.
19
2.4 - SECURITY SHORTCOMINGS AS IDENTIFIED BY GAO
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) did a study on port security
issues and vulnerabilities 4. Within the fiscal year of 2004, several port-specific exercises
were conducted, and coordinated by the US Coast Guard, in order to assess the response
procedures that would be implemented in case of an emergency due to a terrorist attack
and other such incidents. The GAO purpose for such a study was to examine (1) the
emerging framework for coordinating entities involved in security responses, (2) legal
and operational issues emerging from these exercises, and (3) the Coast Guard
management of the analysis procedures of these exercises. 85 such tests were conducted
and reviewed within the fiscal year of 2004, and four of these were observed while being
conducted. The exercises conducted tackled scenarios such as the explosion of a "dirty"
bomb releasing radioactive materials, approaching vessels with a bomb or hazardous
chemical on board, or attacks to hinder critical intermodal infrastructure and other
facilities within or around a port which would result in an economic nightmare.
The feedback from these exercises has not been very positive, which was however
expected. The problems were not related to the legal authority of the federal agencies, nor
were they related to statutory problems. In total there were seven legal issues that came
up during the exercises. However, none of these was serious enough for any of the
participants to express recommendations for statutory changes addressing these issues.
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4 Same as note I
The primary issues were coordination and communication problems between the
authorities and other participants. Of these exercises, 59 percent resulted in feedback
outlining communication issues. These issues were problems such as access to classified
information when needed, inadequate information sharing across agency lines, and
interoperable communication problems between first responders.
Other issues were inadequacies to coordinate resources. Of these exercises, 54
percent showed concerns with the coordination or inadequacy of resources, such as
inadequate facilities and equipment. Changing levels of acceptable risk and response
procedures between exercises also resulted in confusion during the exercises. The need
for additional training in joint agency response seemed to be another major issue
resulting in coordination problems. The feedback showed that in 41 percent of the cases
there were concerns with training issues regarding the response to incident command and
control environments.
Another issue, which was reported less often (28 percent of exercise responses),
but is of greater importance, is a confusion about who has the authority over what.
Something that is unclear among some of the agencies is what agency has the authority to
raise security levels, board vessels, or detain passengers.
Besides the problems that came up from the analysis of the exercises, some of the
major problems that came up were related to the response of the after-action reports by
the participants, which is a common factor for most attempts to implement any new
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technologies or operational procedures. These issues were primarily problems with the
integrity of the reports, such as problems with timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of
the responses.
The exercises that were conducted would not be of much use on their own,
without sufficient feedback, and this feedback had to be timely for it to be of any use for
subsequent exercises. The Coast Guard had set a deadline for the submission of the after-
action reports, which was 60 days after each exercise. However, 60 percent of the
responses were sent after this deadline, on average 61 days after the deadline. This
greatly decreases the value of these responses, since past after-action responses were
routinely reviewed when preparing for future exercises. Although participants reported
that the 60 day timeline was adequate, however, most also reported that other workload
kept them from meeting the deadlines. This clearly shows that since they would not be
receiving any direct compensation for their time and effort of such a report, that it was set
to a very low priority compared to other duties.
Besides the timeliness issue, reports were often inadequately filled out. They were
asked to respond for each of the objectives of each exercise and the level to which they
were met. However, 18 percent of the responses were very basic and did not have
extensive feedback to assist the Coast Guard and the GAO with their assessment. The
feedback lacked sufficient fundamental content, which results in a similar decrease in
usefulness of the after-action response as with untimely responses. The participants,
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besides having other workloads, responded that there were insufficient training and
instructions for completing the after-action reports.
For the exercises to be of any use, the after-actions have to be timely and
complete. Therefore, a good opportunity to improve the successfulness of the response to
incidents such as terrorist attacks was lost. The Coast Guard has tried to resolve these
problems by implementing new management systems to make reports timelier, and other
such steps. However, these were in place for over a year without any significant
improvements.
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2.5 - CONCLUSION
It is clear that since 9/11 there have been many efforts by both federal agencies
such as the US Coast Guard and Customs, and ports, in order to improve security
measures and reduce the inherent vulnerabilities of US seaports. However, many of these
efforts, although intended to be the "silver bullet" for security, have ended up being far
more basic and less effective.
The primary reason behind this is the reluctance of commercial stakeholders to
implement costly security measures unless it results in some form of benefit such as
faster expediting of cargo, or guaranteed preference status with Customs. Ports will only
spend their own funds if the measure results in better service offered, and thus more
revenue. Since government funding has been limited, and in many cases only a fraction
of what the Coast Guard initial estimates were, it is spent on basic improvement such as
fencing (in accordance with funding guidelines).
Cooperation has shown to also be a problem for federal agencies through the
GAO response alert assessment. However, in this case it is less due to inadequate
incentives, but more a lack of training and knowledge of cooperating in order to establish
a successful threat response system. Either way, stakeholders from both public and
private parties do not seem to be very aware of the importance of everyone collaborating
successfully, and seem to believe that if a few parties do not work as hard to make these
24
security implementations work, it will not have a big enough effect on the successfulness
of the system.
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CHAPTER 3 - Generic IT Needs Related to Vessel Arrival
3.1 - OCEAN DOCUMENTATION DESCRIPTION
There are several documents required by federal agencies from each vessel prior
to arrival in port, as well as on entry and departure. In this chapter, these documents will
be examined in order to see where possible improvements can be made.
Exhibit 3.1 is an example of the Notice of Arrival (NOA) form, required by the
US Coast Guard 96 hours prior to a vessel's arrival in port. This deadline used to only be
24 hours in advance but was extended in order to give more time to federal agencies to
investigate the data better and take the necessary precautions for possible threats. The key
information included in the NOA is: Vessel International Maritime Organization (IMO)
number, vessel name, flag, vessel owner, operator, charterer, vessel last four ports of call,
ETA, destinations in the US, terminal and dock of berthing, cargo type and quantity, crew
list and information, and contact phone number. Some of the data examined in order to
evaluate possible threats are changes in ETA, itinerary changes, and where the crew
joined the vessel. One problem area is that for the crew list page (2 of 5), no auditing for
authentication is done, and the information provided is only as good as what the vessel
advises.
A form required by Customs prior to arrival is Form 3171, an example of which is
shown in Exhibit 3.2. The key information required is similar to that of the NOA such as
vessel name and flag, ETA, owner, berthing dock or terminal, as well as some other
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information such as a declaration of intentions, agency representative, manifest
attachments of all foreign cargo, and the Standard Carriers Alpha Codes (SCAC) of
shippers. The methods used to detect threats are the same as for the NOA.
Another document required prior to arrival in port is the original Bill of Lading
(BoL). The key info requested is cargo type, description of cargo, marks and numbers,
quantity, stowage, shipper, consignee, load port, BoL number, payment terms, and
discharge port. One thing authorities look for are any changes on the BoL from the
original.
Several other documents are required upon entry into a US port. One is the US
Customs Form 1300, which is the vessel entrance or clearance statement, shown in
Exhibit 3.3. The requested info for this form are the vessel particulars, IMO number,
owner, operator, and vessel itinerary. Another document is the ship's stores declaration,
Form 1303, shown in Exhibit 3.4. The key information included in this document is fuel
amounts, stores, and bonded stores information. A problem in this document is that what
is stated usually does not show what is actually on board, and the information is not
examined for authentication. This is another source of potential security shortcoming.
The same problem holds for the crew effects, Form 1304.
The Crew and Passenger list form 1-418, shown in Exhibit 3.5, is also a document
required upon entry in port, with similar problems to those of the NOA crew list section
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where the information is not audited. The key information in this form is the crew or
passenger's full name, date of birth, nationality, passport number, and position.
The US Customs Form 1302, the cargo declaration form shown in Exhibit 3.6, is
another source of potential problems to security. Similarly to the other documents, the
information is based solely on information from the vessel owner or operator, and it is not
examined for inaccuracies due to the assumption that owners or operators have examined
them themselves and that they have no benefit in providing the wrong information.
Another very important document is the Certificate of Origin, Form 3229, shown
in Exhibit 3.8. It is a document that is used in conjunction with many other documents,
such as the BoL. The manifest, Form 7512, shown in Exhibit 3.7, is another document
mainly sent along with other documents, such as Form 3171.
Upon departure of a vessel, the BoL and the Customs Form 1300 have to be
resubmitted. Form 1300 is the same, except that the declaration of the new cargo (1302)
is attached. The BoL is also the same except for the attached Shippers Export Declaration
(SED), which can also be filed electronically. For these documents, what is inspected is
whether there have been any changes to the BoL or to the manifest.
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EXHIBIT 3.1 (Continued)
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EXHIBIT 3.1 (Continued)
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EXHIBIT 3.1 (Continued)
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EXHIBIT 3.3
DEPARTMENT OF ThE TREASURY oMB No. 15150080
United States Customs Service
VESSEL ENTRANCE OR CLEARANCE STATEMENT
19 CFR Par 4
ee bck for Instructons] ETRANCE CLEARANCE
TRADE CODES see back) Check Oneo I 2 3 4 05 6
Iiest No 2. Port AnrivalfDepartme 3. Dft & Time of Arrival/Departgre' 4. Vessel Opaing Duft Cm fect and iaches)
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31. Primt and Sign Name of Master, Authorized Agent or Offiter, Date
FOR CUSTOMS USE ONLY
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38. Customs Officer Remarks
39. Signarsre and Title of Officer Receiving Entry/Granting Clearance
Check boxes only itees not coected Cu*en Form 1300 (022)
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EXHIBIT 3.4 (Continued)
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3.2 - OCEAN DOCUMENTATION DESCRIPTION
It is clear that the primary concern with most of the documents each vessel needs
to submit before, during or after arrival in port is data integrity. We saw the same issue
arise in the previous chapter. The information is assumed accurate based on the
"goodwill" of the vessel owners or operators to not send false data. This is a major source
of holes in security which needs to be improved. Since federal agencies base their
decision on what cargo to inspect physically from what they get out of these documents,
it is a very important issue.
Another issue is efficiency. It would be very beneficial to upgrade to electronic
submittals, which would be much faster to fill in as well as collect to examine. Also, if
any document is accidentally inaccurate or incomplete, if it has been submitted
electronically, it is easier to make the necessary corrections or additions. This way it is
also easier to keep a better record of the documents for each vessel, and it is easier to
compare documents before and after stay in port.
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CHAPTER 4 - Following the Information Flow of an Export Container
4.1 - INTRODUCTION
The import and export process in the US is far more complicated and unique
compared to most other countries. This is primarily due to sheer size, and completely
different geographic attributes. With over 185 ports, and more than 100 state, local, and
county agencies, navigation districts, and port authorities, the US public sector port
industry is far less regulated than in other countries. Also, in the US, cargo is usually
transported to the port via rail, road, or other intermodal carriers, due to the great
distances where cargo often originates. In other countries however, cargo at the port
originating from great distances away are actually imports from other countries, and
would be considered transshipments.
This intermodal integrated system makes the US export process more vulnerable
and more complicated since it adds more parties into the process. This also makes the
entire data exchange process, whether hard copy or electronic, more complicated. It is
therefore important to examine the information flow for the export process of a container
in the US. To do this, all the stakeholders, as well as their roles and responsibilities in the
process have to be identified.
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4.2 - STAKEHOLDER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A stakeholder is anyone involved in the export process of a container, including
all intermodal links associated with this process, which starts from the shipper and ends
at the consignee. Some of these stakeholders are common worldwide, but some are
unique to the US export process. These stakeholders are not necessarily different entities.
Very often, a company can have multiple responsibilities. The stakeholders in this
process are:
" Shipper/Seller: A shipper is the individual or firm that initiates the entire process.
It is the shipper's own goods that will be transported. For the tanker market,
shippers are occasionally the owners or charterers of the vessels themselves.
However, for containerized cargo this is not the case.
* Freight Forwarder: The freight forwarder has the duty to perform the tasks to
assist the shipment of goods. In many countries, the freight forwarder has many
more duties, which are often aligned with the duties a marine terminal operator
and an ocean carrier perform in the US. A freight forwarder is hired by the
shipper, occasionally along with the consignee.
" Ocean Carrier: The ocean carrier is the owner or operator of the vessel on which
the cargo will be transported from one port to another. Some additional tasks
ocean carriers perform are the coordination of the delivery of containers with the
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marine terminal, maintaining an equipment inventory list (EIL), and providing a
load tendering agreement for rail or truck to generate the train manifest.
" Warehouse Operators: They are the operators of storage areas and warehouses,
and often perform tasks such as picking, packing, labeling, and sub-assembling
containers. Large shippers, port or marine terminal operators, or freight
forwarders are very frequently warehouse operators themselves.
" Drayage Company: Their task is to manage the intermodal land transportation
into and out of a port (i.e. pick up and delivery) such as agreements with ocean
carriers for trucking goods for intermodal transport. They often provide other
various third-party logistics services.
* Depot Operators: Depot operators are usually located in a port, and are most
commonly owned and operated by ocean carriers to own and manage containers.
" Equipment Suppliers: Equipment suppliers own and lease a range of intermodal
equipment such as chassis, trailers, tractors, and containers.
* Regulators: Regulators are the government agencies that are in charge of
approving and inspecting the cargo being moved, such as the US Customs, US
Coast Guard, INS, etc.
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" Port/Terminal Operators: Port operators act as mediators between the stakeholders
in the loading and unloading process. Marine terminal operators typically operate
for a specific ocean carrier. In the US, marine terminal operators are also in
charge of clearing the cargo for Customs and other agencies. They possibly
inspect containers, and must review the Drayage companies' contracts and the
interchange agreements.
" Intermodal Marketing Company: Intermodal marketers are unique to the United
States export process and work for freight forwarders and coordinate the
movement of cargo between different modes.
" Rail Carrier: Rail carriers, as well as trucking companies and other such modes
are the middle man who transport cargo from inland US to the marine terminal.
They have a much larger role in the export process for the US due to the vast
distances being covered, which in most countries would be considered imports
and transshipments.
* Consignee: Consignee is the firm or individual who will eventually be the final
destination of the cargo.
An illustration of how all these stakeholders of the export process interact can be
seen in Figure 4.1. It is clear that the process in the US is very complicated since many
stakeholders are interdependent with other stakeholders, without a clear coordinating
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party in the process. In the US, the freight forwarder, ocean carrier, and terminal
operators all share responsibilities such as processing the shipment, obtaining, picking,
and packing containers, and preparing export documentation. On the other hand, due to
the fewer intermodal stakeholders in the process, in other countries the process is far less
complicated. As seen in Figure 4.2, an example of a foreign export process, the freight
forwarder acts as a coordinator by collecting much more of the information that is being
exchanged. At every point stakeholders send the freight forwarder updates for the freight
forwarder to prepare the necessary documentations.
Shipper
Fonvarder Intermodal Rail Carrier7ardr * -)0' Ma.ret ing C o.
Regulators Marine OceanR r Terminal Op Carrier
Drayage
Company
Figure 4.1: Stakeholder Interaction of export process of a container in the US
Source: The Logistics Institute - Singapore, May 2003
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Shipper
Land Trans. Forwarder Regulator
Operators
Depot Warehouse Port Operator Ocean
Operator Operators Carrier
Figure 4.2: Stakeholder Interaction of export process of a container in Singapore
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4.3 - CONTAINER INTERMODAL MOVEMENT
Collectively, the stakeholders have several tasks to perform in the process of
exporting a container. These include (i) processing the shipment, (ii) obtaining the
container, (iii) picking and packing the container, (iv) delivering the container to the port,
(v) preparing export documentation, and (vi) releasing the cargo for export.
The first step is the creation of the Bill of Lading between the importer and
exporter of the cargo. The Bill of Lading is used to create the Letter of Credit. The
processing of the shipment is initiated by the shipper who sends the order for goods to the
freight forwarder, who in turn contacts the ocean carrier to book the shipment. The
freight forwarder will usually also contact the intermodal carrier who will carry out the
transport through the entire supply chain from dray to rail to port.
Then, the freight forwarder will contact the marine terminal operator to produce a
preliminary stow plan. The Stow Plan, along with the Carrier's Bill of Lading, Shipper's
Export Declaration, and Import Berthing Application, are used to create the Export
Manifest. Customs then examines the Export Manifest and decides if the ship will be
cleared. The Stow plan also generates the ocean carrier Bill of Lading and the load
verification.
The next step in the process to obtain the empty container. The Customer Freight
Booking Request is used to create the Load Tendering Agreement for Dray and the
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Booking Number. If rail is used in the process, a Load Tendering Agreement for rail is
also created, which is used by the dray operator to pick up the empty container from the
equipment supplier, and deliver it from one intermodal carrier to another (i.e. truck to
rail, rail to truck, truck to marine terminal). Information is then sent back to the
equipment inventory list, from which an EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) for the Dray
Dispatch is created. The depot operators take care of the containers and swap Equipment
Interchange Reports/Receipts (EIR) with the truck driver of the drayage company. The
EIR is linked to the Equipment Inventory List (EIL) which is used in the cargo manifest.
Once the shipper has received the empty container and has loaded it, another EDI
is created which is the Equipment Interchange Receipt (EIR) and Parking Location
Assignment and are sent to the rail terminal or marine terminal for when the trucker
arrives with the loaded container.
While at sea, the Ocean Carrier prepares a rail booking request EDI. An Import
Berthing Application is also sent to the marine terminal prior to arrival in port. At the
marine terminal, Customs may or may not inspect the container, and once they have they
sent a release notice, it is then used by the Ocean Carrier to create a release notice EDI.
Once the marine terminal has received the freight release from the carrier, along
with the Cargo Release from the regulatory agencies, the cargo is released to be
transported out of the terminal. At this time, the marine terminal sends another
Equipment Inventory Receipt for the availability of the chassis. A Load Tendering
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Agreement is then sent once the container is ready to be picked up from the terminal for
delivery to the final destination by truck or rail and then truck. If rail is used, another EIR
is sent at the rail terminal. Once the Consignee has the cargo, the ocean carrier, drayage
company, intermodal carrier, shipper/freight forwarder/shipper agent, get a paper receipt.
An EIR is then sent once the empty container has been returned to the marine terminal.
The process described above is summarized in table 4.1. It is also presented as a detailed
timeline in exhibit 4.1, and in the diagrams in exhibit 4.2.
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Table 4.1 - Information Exchange for Export Process
Information Instrument Source/Destination
1 Order for Goods Shipper/Freight Forwarder(FF)
2 Load tendering request for Dray, Ocean FF
or Rail
3 Vessel Booking FF/Ocean Carrier (OC) or IntermodalMarketing Company(IMC)/OC
4 Vessel Booking Confirmation OC/FF and Marine Terminal Operator(MTO)
5 Equipment Inventory List (EIL) OC/IMC or Equipment Supplier
6 Load Tendering Agreement OC/Truck or Rail Carrier (RC)
7 Equipment Interchange Receipt OC's or EC's EIL
8 Packing List Warehouse/Dray Company (DC) and FF
9 House Bill of Lading FF/OC
10 Ocean Bill of Lading OC/FF
11 Export Authorization FF/OC/Regulators
12 Cargo Manifest FF
13 Proof of Delivery Destination FF/ Source FF
14 Load Tendering Agreement for Dray OC/DC
15 Trailer Interchange Agreement or OC/DCOnetime Contract for Transport
16 Load Tendering Agreement for Rail OC/RC
which generates the Train Manifest
17 Import Berthing Application (to ensure OC/MTOBerth Assignment
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EXHIBIT 4.1 - Timeline of data exchange for export process of a container
- Contract for Goods, Bill of Lading/ Letter of credit: Agreement between Import
Buyer and Seller.
- Order for Goods: From Seller to Shipper.
- Request for Transport with Requirements and Specifications: From Shipper to
Ocean Carrier who prepares Vessel Booking and assigns booking number. Also sent to
the Marine Terminal by the Shipper to prepare Stow Plan, Ocean Carrier Bill of Lading,
and the Export Manifest.
- Vessel Booking Number: sent to Ocean Carrier's Equipment Inventory List (EIL).
- Load Tendering Agreement for Dray/Rail/Truck/Ocean Carriage: Sent by Ocean
Carrier to Dray Operator, Trucking/Rail company. This starts the process for pick up of
empty equipment from supplier. The Load Tendering Agreement for Dray is triggered by
the Ocean Carrier's EIL and sends an EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) to the drayage
company and the Dray Dispatch. Load Tendering Agreement for Rail generates Train
Manifest from the Rail Carrier.
- Cargo Arrival Notification: Sent by Rail Carrier to the Ocean Carrier. This allows
driver to pick up container at the rail yard.
- Booking Confirmation: EDI sent by the Ocean Carrier to the Marine terminal, who
requests a driver and cab. Another EDI is sent to the EIL once the truck had left with the
empty container to pick up the cargo.
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- Equipment Interchange Receipt with Parking Location Assignment: Requested by
the terminal from the truck driver when he arrives with full container.
- Equipment Interchange Receipt: Sent by the Marine terminal to the Ocean Carrier
once truck has arrived which is triggers another EDI to the EIL.
- Rail Booking Request: While ship is underway, Ocean Carrier sends EDI.
- Import Berthing Application: sent to the Marine Terminal Operator prior to ship
arrival to ensure a berthing assignment.
- Customs Release Notice: EDI to Ocean Carrier and Marine Terminal.
- Freight Release: Sent by Ocean Carrier once cargo has cleared Customs and payment
has been made. This sends a message to the EIL to identify available chassis.
- Cargo Delivery Order: EDI sent by Ocean Carrier or customs house broker to Dray
Dispatch.
- Cargo Release: EDI sent once the Marine terminal has received the freight order.
- Load Tendering Agreement for Dray: Sent by the Marine Terminal to Dray
Dispatch, to ultimately result in an Equipment Interchange Receipt.
- Delivery by Truck: Equipment Interchange Receipt sent to Drayage company, Ocean
Carrier, Intermodal Carriers once Consignee has received the cargo by truck.
55
- Equipment Interchange Receipt: Sent by the Ocean Carrier for the EIL once empty
container has been returned.
EXHIBIT 4.2 - Diagrammatic representation of the Container Documentation
Exchange
Contract for Goods
Bill of Lading (BoL)/
Letter of Credit
Load Tendering Agreement for Dray, Stow Plan
Rail, Truck, or Ocean Carriage Ocean Carrier BoL
Export Manifest
Equipment Inventory List (EIL)
Train Manifest
Caro Arrival Notification
I
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EXHIBIT 4.2 (CONTINUED)
I
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4.4 - CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the export process of a container in the US is far more
complex than in most other countries, primarily due to the vast distances covered by the
cargo before it ever reaches the marine terminal. This adds more stakeholders and more
steps to the whole process, and increases the amount of information being exchanged,
whether it is electronic or hard copy.
This complexity is further enhanced by not having a central stakeholder
coordinating everything, such as the freight forwarder does in Singapore for example.
Having a coordinating party would simplify things greatly, and since someone would
have most of the documents being exchanged readily available, the tracking process of
the container would be more visible and more secure.
Therefore, I believe that if the US can somehow move to a more centralized
process and minimize the interaction of all the stakeholders between each other and have
each of them focus around that one central party, the process would become more
efficient and more secure. This has been attempted through the development of "one-
stop-shopping" data collecting systems which are discussed in greater length in chapter 5.
Also, if more documents move from hard-copy to electronic format such as the EIR's, the
export and import processes would become even more efficient and secure.
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CHAPTER 5 - Ports as Information Managers
5.1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL CONCERNS
As previously discussed in chapter 2, ports are classified under two categories:
landlord and operator ports. Most landlord ports, as already mentioned, have spent their
budgets on Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), fencing, and other such general security
measures. On the other hand, some ports in the US have taken it upon themselves to
develop their own data collection systems, to enhance security and efficiency for their
marine terminal and intermodal activities. Each of these systems was publicly funded to
address post-9/l1 maritime homeland security issues. However, these systems have failed
to receive enough popularity for comparable reasons, despite their being well made
technologically. Other ports have decided to simply use commercially developed
software. Due to private funding rather than public funding, the focus was mostly on
improving the level-of-service offered to users. Therefore, despite offering very similar
features, these systems have received far wider acceptance by users from the private
sector. Each of these public or private port data collecting systems are discussed in detail
in this chapter.
Furthermore, companies such as Savi Technology have decided to develop
specific areas in the intermodal information sector, such as electronic security seals with
RFID tracking capabilities for containers. They have focused on pressuring the
government for the mandatory use of this technology, which could then be incorporated
in these data collecting systems.
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5.2.1 - DRMEC - RISK Alert
RISK Alert is the security component of RAPID Center. RAPID is, in turn, part
of the Pennsylvania non-profit organization, DRMEC (Delaware River Maritime
Enterprise Council), a Pennsylvania Homeland Security national demonstration project.
The budget for this project was $1.8 million, of which $800 thousand was a one time
investment by the DRMEC for the licensing and modification of commercially available
software of Transentric L.L.C., the commercial software company of Union Pacific
Corporation. Initially the project received $150 thousand from the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development (PADCED). This initial project
was completed in June of 2002 by DRMEC and the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority
(PRPA). It was managed for DRMEC by The Howland Group, Inc. The rest of the budget
($850 thousand) was contributed from the $92.3 million grant from the US Government
for the improvement of port security.
RISK Alert System
DESIGNATEDUPPLY CMAIN
slupment overseas Origi Pont Part Of Nmrth rShipme.t
Onigm (Ongin) and Ocean Ph~ilade#phia Amffrcan Destinatma
Advance Shipment and other
Security-related Informgtio n
- Leverages existing business information,
processes and technologies
" Uses Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
technology For Federal
- Provides equal access by all appropriate law and local law
enforcement agencies
- Allows shippers to demonstrate secure
commodity flows
Figure 5.3: Overview of RISK Alert data flow and features
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Figure 5.4: Sample of Information Flow in RISK Alert
RISK Alert was created primarily as an attempt to solve three main concerns that
federal studies showed post-9/ 1: (1) availability to law enforcement agencies of
relevant actionable intelligence on seaport crime; (2) awareness of terrorist threats and
availability of threat information to the private sector as well as to inspection personnel at
seaports; and (3) integrated information on the movement of vessels, people, and cargo
within seaports and ready availability of that information to government agencies and
private sector security organizations. RISK Alert is a common-access transportation
security information system in the country available to all levels of law enforcement.
Through RISK Alert, information about shipments is available for U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, and
other federal and local agencies. This results in fewer delays since it allows law
enforcement agencies to make informed decisions about which cargo or crew to inspect
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and which to consider as secure to be expedited. The central concept was that commercial
participants would "provide continually updated data about the movement of shipments
through their supply chains (information which is generally maintained as a normal
course of business) and law enforcement personnel would have immediate and uniform
access to that data through the secure, neutral, non-profit, RISK Alert information portal.
RISK Alert is also not meant to be a technology demonstration but more of an
information sharing solution. It serves as a system for "one-stop shopping" information
about shipments moving to or from foreign origins by ocean or land-based transport. It is
also a way for shippers to show how secure their flows are to US Customs through
programs such as C-TPAT. Also, unlike other similar systems that will be discussed later
on, RISK Alert was not trying to be a global solution from the start, but instead started
off by focusing regionally and then would try to expand as the project moves on. This
would hopefully minimize some of the concerns and problems of information sharing that
would likely follow.
Information on the ship's position is captured using PoleStar's PurpleFinder
system. A screen-capture example of a PoleStar map can be seen in Figure 5.3. Apart
from this, noon maritime position reports are sent daily until the ship's arrival. It also
allows for subscriptions to "alerts", therefore customizing the information for each law
enforcement representative's separate needs. Alerts for example are sent if a ship deviates
from a registered plan in such a way that should be of concern. RISK Alert also collects
digital pictures, taken by the ship's master, of each crew member, along with their names,
nationalities, etc. This is done primarily to minimize confusion caused mainly by
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commonalities of Middle Eastern names. This also provides added security intelligence to
the local ATTF (Anti-Terrorist Task Force). Other information also submitted: Coast
Guard Notice of Arrival, Coast Guard Cargo Manifest, Pre Arrival Questionnaire, and
Immigrations Crew List.
Figure 5.5: PurpleFinder screenshot
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Figure 5.6: RISK Alert crewmember information page screenshot
Other information gathered is the Voyage Order and the Vessel Arrival Notice.
The Voyage Order is setup to receive basic information about shipments, such as the bill
of lading number, and allows someone to uniquely identify the shipment, shipper,
consignee, product and quantity, and the origin and destination. The Vessel Arrival
Notice (VAN) is a document used by the USCG 96 hours prior to the vessels arrival into
port. This includes the Vessel Automated Manifest System (AMS), which is an electronic
cargo declaration. The VAN includes a notice of vessel arrival, and a Pre-arrival
questionnaire, which is also used to possibly generate alerts. It also includes an INS form
which contains crew information.
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5.2.2 PROOF OF CONCEPT DEMONTRATION
A national proof-of-concept demonstration of the capabilities of RISK Alert
started on January 2 7th 2003. The purpose of this demonstration was to train and present
RISK Alert features to law enforcement agencies and government personnel. This
demonstration, however, although initially planned to track containerized meat shipments
from Australia, was instead performed with two VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers)
operating between West Africa and the Delaware River, with the cooperation of the
Sunoco, Inc. oil company. Since DRMEC was interested in making RISK Alert a national
standard for improving efficiency and homeland security, they would have to expand
beyond containers, which are however the most complicated. In addition, the Delaware
River supported the largest petrochemical refining center on the East Coast, adding to
DRMEC's interest in this sector. Therefore, by using tankers, DRMEC was simplifying
the tracking process by minimizing the information needed, and also was able to show
that their system can be implemented for the entire shipping community, and not just
containers. Although this demonstration was able to demonstrate RISK Alert abilities to
successfully deliver information to law enforcement agencies, the information being
shared was too small to provide sufficient proof that it could function as an effective
deconfliction tool and as a tool to bring the large number of stakeholders together.
In general, the demonstration resulted in positive feedback from the participants.
This encouraged DRMEC to propose that the USCG adopt RISK Alert as a standard
maritime homeland security system. This proposal was rejected, along with similar
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proposals from other systems, showing that the business of maritime homeland security is
not yet mature enough to yield a standard system for incorporation into federal law.
Despite the positive feedback, many concerns were put forth as recommendations
for future changes to the system. The main challenge, as expected, was ensuring the
sufficient cooperation and coordination between stakeholders. As indicated earlier in this
chapter, this has been the main focal point for all of these "one-stop" systems being
developed. For commercial stakeholders, the main concern was the involuntary release of
confidential records such as trade secrets or proprietary information, due to gaps in
security, especially since the data would be shared on the internet. Something like that
could damage a firm's reputation, lower consumer confidence, and result in a decrease in
market share, without sufficient incentives and returns from the existence and use of
systems such as RISK Alert. There are also many issues arising from the need for these
systems to get data from government agencies on potential threats, in order to be able to
react to potential vulnerabilities more effectively. One concern is national security, which
may prevent agencies from sharing information. If information is to be shared,
declassifying it can take too long and would no longer be of any use to time-sensitive
operations. The other concern is that people who need access to this information may not
have the security clearances necessary.
All these concerns have led to similar problems to those outlined by GAO and
presented in chapter 2. It is not a surprise that the initial survey responses after the
demonstration yielded positive remarks. With the small amount of data, it was a
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relatively easy task to manage the data timeliness and accuracy and completeness, and
therefore the majority of the data received was timely.
Although in the majority of the cases the Voyage Order was received two weeks
before the vessel's departure, despite the limited participants, there were still cases where
this information was only received a day prior to departure or not at all. The fact that the
demonstration participants voluntarily agreed to take part in this demonstration but still
had some trouble with sending information on time makes this problem even bigger. This
would only expand very rapidly to a major concern when the entire regional shipping
community is involved in this process.
In some cases, the Voyage Order, besides not being in sent on time, was
incomplete. For example, the name of the vessel was missing. In some other instances,
the shipment number was incorrect. Although DRMEC support that this was not a
problem since by contacting the shipping agents they were able to obtain the information
they needed, this would only work for the limited data being exchanged in the proof-of-
concept demonstration. It is highly unlikely that DRMEC would have the resources to
successfully manage to retrieve missing information from many more shipping agents,
and more importantly to actually manage to do so on time for the information to be of
any value at all.
There are many other instances of data integrity issues besides the Voyage
Orders. One example is instances of inaccurate or missing crew member date-of-births on
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INS documents and crewmember pictures. Another example is inaccurate Noon Position
Reports. In one instance, the noon report sent one day was identical to the one sent the
previous day, although the ship was not stationary. More important than any of these
issues were inaccuracies observed on the VAN, a far more critical element to RISK Alert.
In some cases, information of the next port of call and date of call were missing from the
VAN. More troubling is that the information on the VAN and other documents rarely was
verified for authenticity. It was simply assumed that the data provider had already
verified the data authenticity.
Moving beyond the data integrity issues, during the demonstration there were
many other problems with the system. First of all, the data was input manually, which is
less accurate and far less efficient. This was acknowledged by DRMEC as a feature that
needed to be changed for use beyond the pilot demonstration. Besides this improvement,
DRMEC had in plan to possibly include a vessel maintenance history and vessel stowage
plan in the data collected. Also, it was requested that passport country and number be
added to the crewmember information. A more complicated improvement requested was
the improvement of the loading of the shipment plan. For the pilot, RISK Alert shipment
plan was created and loaded into RISK Alert manually, which would be impossible to do
when this has to be done for thousands of shipment plans considering how labor intensive
this process is. Therefore, in order for RISK Alert to be function, this feature has to be
automated first.
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RISK Alert funding has been discontinued, and the project has been put on the
shelf. The data integrity issues led commercial stake holders to be doubtful about the
system. Commercial participants did not seem to be getting enough in return. The risk of
proprietary information leaking out to competitors was too large.
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5.3.1 PORT OF NY/NJ - F.I.R.S.T.
The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey (PANY/NJ), supported by the
Federal Highway Administration Office (FHWA), has developed a "one-stop shopping"
system for cargo information tracking similar to RISK Alert; the Freight Information
Real-Time System for Transport (FIRST). One main difference from RISK Alert is that
its primary focus was not security, but instead congestion mitigation. The FIRST project
was initiated before the 9/11 crisis, which could be one of the main reasons behind some
of the most important problems FIRST was facing. Post 9/11 funding was drastically
reduced, especially for the purposes of marketing and reaching out to the port
community. It also resulted in the project being rushed, and the focus being shifted
midway into the development of the project.
Americas Systems, Inc (ASI) designed and maintained the website and server,
and also processed the data flow. Unlike RISK Alert which was based on off-the-shelf
commercial software, FIRST was designed from scratch by members of the private sector
intermodal industry in cooperation with public sector partners. FIRST used File Transfer
Protocol (FTP), and collected information from ocean carriers, terminal operators, and
rail and trucking companies. FTP was used to encourage data providers to provide their
data to FIRST, since charges from using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) would be
eliminated. The main issues FIRST was trying to address were reduction of truck queue
lines by reducing the number of necessary trips by trucks to the port, and thus ultimately
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reduce emissions, as well as improving terminal operation efficiency and at the Port of
NY/NJ overall.
Terminals Cargo Info Truckers
Carriera Booking Status Consigness
Video Feeds Container Tracking Shippers
Existing Systems Container Monitor Forwarders
Other Web Sites Trucking Co. Status Brokers
Trucker Nomination Logistics Providers
Driver Assignment PANYINJ
Delivery Confirmation OtherPort
Trucker Containers Customers
Ship Arrival
TrafcVideo Feeds
Terminal Video Feeds
Abb Links
Figure 5.7: FIRST Information sources, types, and users
The main feature that FIRST offers is real-time information on cargo status,
including customs status, hazardous cargo information, vessel or carrier, date in, etc.
They also provide real-time booking status, container tracking of all movements for the
past 90 days, including container monitoring with alerts for pick-up, gate transactions,
inspections, weights, destination and proof or delivery. It also offers vessel schedules,
web cameras, and port traffic conditions. A useful feature on the FIRST web-site is the
ability to create, view, and edit a watch-list of containers that are of interest. It was also
planned to incorporate into FIRST the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and
the Customs Automated Manifest System. VTS are shore-side systems which range from
simple information messages to ships, such as position of other traffic or meteorological
warnings, to management of traffic within a port or waterway. Ships entering a VTS area
report to the authorities by radio, and may be tracked by the VTS control centre.
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FIRST successfully integrated SEA LINK, a trucker identification system. SEA
LINK eliminates most of the paperwork a truck driver has to present when entering a
marine terminal for pick up and delivery, reducing delays. It provides computerized
registrations for a trucking company's drivers, allowing truck drivers to pick up and
deliver cargo to and from any terminal they have authorized access to using a single ID
card.
Another feature planned was Cargo*Mate, a chassis tracking system for the
FIRST system, to provide end-to-end cargo visibility. It uses RFID and GPS technology
to track a chassis' location, size/type, history, tether status, in/out facility information,
container association, and even its tire pressure, cargo weight, mechanical condition, and
inspection status. For this it utilizes built in sensors, microprocessors, modem, GPS, and a
rechargeable battery. Table 5.1 shows how these features are available to different levels
of access to the FIRST system.
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Figure 5.8: Overview of FIRST
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Table 5.1 - Levels of Access to FIRST System Features
Basic SpcfcSpia
Feature Public Access Registered Busec $csUser Access
Container Trace
Booking Inquiry 0
Port Traffic Alerts
Port Directory (including SEA
LINK® Inquiry)
Vessel Activity Inquiry a a
Waterway Activity
Web Cameras (PNCT, Global,
Interport Gates)
Watchlist Menu (monitor, create,
edit)
USDA Search
Cargo*Mate® Chassis Search
Truck Nominations a
Truck Appointment System
(FUTURE)
U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic
Service (FUTURE)
Customs Border Patrol Automated
Manifest System (FUTURE)
5.3.2 CONCERNS
Although FIRST was technologically successful, it did not catch on as much as
expected. In order for FIRST to be fully functional, it is required that the information be
received from all terminal operators and shipping lines servicing the Port of NY/NJ. This
became increasingly more difficult, which has resulted in FIRST only using the site for
the online berth application function from the beginning of 2005. The participants did not
feel they were getting enough in return for providing all this information for free.
Terminal operators are asked to answer additional inquiries from trucking companies,
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which causes additional work. Truckers are also required to visit multiple websites to
collect all the needed information, also resulting in extra work.
There were good signs of interest with almost 4500 monthly hits on the website
just after its launch in 2001. This was mainly triggered due to increased demand due to
9/11. However, the hits dropped to around 1000 by early 2003. The container tracking
feature usage also decreased from 1000 to 100 monthly hits. Registration was also very
limited to make FIRST a viable solution. Only around one percent of motor carriers in the
Port of NY/NJ had registered by 2003.
Similar to the main problem that RISK Alert was facing, FIRST had problems
ensuring the integrity of the data being transferred on their site. Registered users often
found that information was missing, late, or inaccurate. Ocean carriers and terminal
operators have the responsibility over the accuracy and timeliness of the data they send,
and although FIRST allows them to do so at no cost via FTP, they did not have any
incentives to guarantee data accuracy. On many occasions, ocean carriers and terminal
operators would have received several data updates when only one set of data had been
posted on FIRST. Just like with RISK Alert, ocean carriers were hesitant to share all their
information due to the risk of proprietary information leaking out due to gaps in security
on the website. This was only further enhanced by the purchasing of ASI by Maersk
Data, which created a serious conflict of interest. In addition, the limited funding which
would stop by the end of 2003, meant that FIRST does not have the technical staff
required to successfully address data quality issues.
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Providing FIRST services at no cost has also been a major reason for the system
not being accepted more widely. Although this was initially thought to attract more
attention from participants, it meant that once funding was stopped in December 2003
that the available features would depreciate without revenues to support their operation.
For FIRST to continue, new forms of funding would have to be found. One possibility
would be to provide a fee based service, with different fees for different levels of
services. This lack of funding resulted in another issue as well. Since it was greatly
limited due to post-9/11 measures, it resulted in FIRST being introduced with fewer
features, with a plan to add the rest as the project progressed. However, a move like that
was detrimental, since without the full features upfront, such as the truck appointment
system, the benefits such as decreased congestion were not apparent. If FIRST had the
proper funding and had introduced a stronger product from the start, the results would
have been more apparent to the system's potential users, who would have been keener to
subscribing and continuing the use of FIRST services.
The FIRST system failed to solve any of the issues initially centered on. Since it
was never widely accepted by the private sector, and ocean carriers and marine terminals
were not very willing to provide their information, they failed at improving efficiency by
reducing the time trucks spent in queues to enter a terminal, and the number of
unnecessary trips taken by truck drivers. This meant that the issue of reducing emissions
was also not resolved.
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5.4.1 EMODAL
Another "one-stop shopping" information system that has been developed is
eModal. Unlike RISK Alert and FIRST, eModal is a private, for-profit company portal,
providing their services for a fee that changes depending on the level of usage. The
project was initiated in Irvine, California in 1999, and the website was up and running by
February of 2000. The other two systems were focused on one specific port and region,
and had plans to expand if the project succeeded. On the other hand, eModal started as a
system targeted to multiple ports. It has grown to be the most widely used system in the
US port community with 14 ports and 36 terminals supplying information to their
database, and over 6400 registered users by 2003. eModal started with similar objectives
to those of the FIRST system, such as improving efficiency and decreasing congestion at
container terminal. This is primarily since both were initiated prior to 9/11. Therefore,
their main focus was not port security. Unlike FIRST that had the pressure to adapt to the
new demand for security and change their scope, eModal, as a private company,
remained focused on efficiency rather than security.
The features being offered on eModal are similar to those offered by FIRST, such
as weather conditions at terminals and ports, FTP data transmissions to minimize costs,
real-time cargo information, container tracking and monitoring, and trucker nominations.
It does not offer any real-time booking information at this time. eModal does not offer
chassis tracking such as the FIRST system's Cargo*Mate, nor does it provide real-time
traffic information. However, it is the only system with a feature that allows the payment
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of demurrage and other such fees online. It is also unique by offering the Electronic
Delivery Order (eDO) system. The eDO system is a feature that allows registered users to
receive, track, and manage delivery orders electronically, which is an efficiency
enhancing tool.
5.4.2 CONCERNS
Although what eModal offers is technologically very similar to what FIRST had
to offer, it managed to get far wider acceptance in the industry than FIRST ever did. To
emphasize this even more, the main focus of the FIRST system, the Howland Hook
marine terminal in the Port of NY/NJ, is now using eModal. They had the luxury of not
having to change their focus towards security issues. Since they had launched prior to
9/11, they did not have to rush to launch their system. FIRST was greatly affected by
post-9/l1 demand for security, and was therefore not able to do careful business planning
like eModal did. Despite the fact that FIRST was free, eModal came up with a fee based
structure that was accepted by its users. Since eModal was not receiving government
funding, and was charging its users for the services, it was more focused on meeting user
needs on time and cost benefits rather than satisfying government needs for maritime
homeland security. This is precisely the reason eModal has been so widely accepted. The
success of these "one-stop" information systems is highly dependent on the acceptance
by users in the private sector, who are primarily concerned on reducing their costs and
improving efficiency, which is not something that FIRST or RISK Alert focused on.
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5.5.1 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS - PORTNET
The Port of Singapore (PSA), with over 9.9 million TEUs handled in the first half
of 2004, is the world's leading port in the handling of containerized cargo, and has not
stayed behind in the recent efforts to introduce efficiency enhancing IT services as part of
the services they offer. They have been offering IT services since 1984. PSA has
developed the PORTNET system, which was launched on May 8 th, 2000, and
encapsulates 16 years of experience. Besides the port-wide solution, PSA has also
developed CITOS for marine terminal-specific use.
Similarly to eModal, PORTNET is not focused around post-9/11 maritime
homeland security needs, but rather solely focused on efficiency for shippers and ocean
carriers. With the immense volume of containers handled daily by PSA, PORTNET was
slowly becoming a necessity in order for Singapore to remain competitive and offer high
levels of service. Without this efficiency enhancing system, service would deteriorate as
volumes keep growing, and shippers and ocean carriers would slowly seek new less
congested ports.
PORTNET has proven to be a rather successful system, and therefore PSA has
decided to offer this system as a package to other ports, similar to what eModal is doing.
One port in the United States that showed interest for the package was the Port of Seattle.
In January of 2001, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding with PSA, to market,
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implement and operate a Web-based information technology system for the Port of
Seattle.
PORTNET users can make use of online ordering and documentation, and track
and trace capabilities such as real-time booking status, vessel tracking, and container
tracking via their Cargo2D2 feature. The PORTNET system brings together shipping
lines, freight forwarders, shippers and government agencies, and facilitates business-to-
business transactions for the port and shipping industries. PORTNET also enhances
productivity and reduces operational costs for users through efficient information
management through its database.
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5.6.1 SAVI - SMART CONTAINERS
Apart from complete IT intermodal solutions such as those presented above, there
have been developments in more specific areas of the intermodal system. One of the most
prominent developments has been RFID tags for containers, such as "Smart Box"
containers, with Savi Technology being the leader behind the efforts of establishing this
technology. Electronic seals on containers can also be used for the tracking features in the
aforementioned "one-stop" data systems.
Savi has been working hard with the US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the development of the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and is seeking the adoption of
its 'Smart Box' technology as a US standard. C-TPAT is an initiative that hopes to get
shippers to become more proactive on security issues by providing better service in
return, such as "green lane" qualification. The most secure shippers with "green lane" or
even the new level of "bright green lane" qualification would get preferable treatment
such as immediate cargo release without inspection.
Features included in 'Smart Box' RFID tags include the ability to automatically
detect intrusions, sense interior environmental changes in temperature, humidity, tilt,
light, shock, vibration, and atmospheric pressure, and the ability to detect hazardous
cargo such as radioactive materials and wirelessly communicate their location and
security status to a global information network in real-time. The door-end of a container
80
is fitted with multiple sensors, Electronic Product Code (EPC)-compliant smart tags and
active radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies.
As outlined by Savi, the potential benefits of using 'Smart Box' technology for
shippers are reduced inventory, reduced out-of-stock, reduced lead-time variance,
increased manufacturing uptime, reduced administrative costs and fees, theft prevention,
and the prevention of lost containers. Such benefits, along with green lane clearances, can
help in attracting shippers and ocean carriers, since as mentioned before they are hesitant
to freely improve their security standards without sufficient incentives in return.
Although the 'Smart Box' technology is a very good concept for both government
agencies and commercial stakeholders, I believe adopting the technology of a single
provider such as Savi should be avoided, especially since Savi is a for-profit
organization. However, promoting the high-tech container seal technology as a whole,
and incorporating it by making it compulsory in the near future, could be beneficial if it is
reliable and cost effective.
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, many intermodal data collection systems for the use of ports and
marine terminals were presented in detail. All of these systems, whether they were
developed by a collaboration of government authorities and specific port authorities, or
by private companies developing their own software, had very similar technological
features. They all provided methods to track container movements and their booking
status in real-time, as well as other real-time cargo data. They also offered features such
as vessel tracking and trucking nominations. To differentiate from each other, they all
offer unique features, such as the FIRST system's Cargo*Mate chassis tracking, and
eModal's eDO system. However, none of these features alone was enough to explain the
reason behind the success of one system over another. From a technology standpoint, all
the systems presented in this chapter were well designed solutions.
A common concern between RISK Alert and FIRST, and possibly the most
important reason for their limited success, was their primary focus: maritime homeland
security. Although this scope satisfied the needs put forth by several agencies, it did not
satisfy user needs. Users, such as shippers, ocean carriers, freight forwarders, rail and
trucking companies, and terminal operators were not as concerned with homeland
security as much as with efficiency of operations and cost reduction. Users did not see
enough of a return on investment for spending the time to send accurate and timely
information to these systems' databases. This resulted in a cyclical problem, since with
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these data accuracy, timeliness, and completeness issues, the level-of-service also
drastically deteriorated, and the primary goals were not resolved.
Apart from the data accuracy issues, there are also other integrity issues. Private
users feel that there is a great risk that proprietary information can fall into competitors'
hands, which can result in enormous losses. Although this should have been a problem
for the private systems as well, it did not seem to be part of the user mindset. This is most
probably due to the general satisfaction of users due to the many efficiency-enhancing
and cost reducing benefits they were receiving, which could overshadow the data security
issues. In addition, the private systems typically did not ask for company-sensitive
information.
Another issue faced by RISK Alert and FIRST, which is related to their focus on
homeland security, has to do with funding, and pressures to develop the systems as soon
as possible. Since they were relying on limited government funding which was eventually
split between all major US gateways, and needed to show results quickly, they did not
spend nearly as much time and money as necessary on marketing the products
successfully. One mistake was to start offering incomplete services with the intent to
develop the rest and include them at a future date. This way, the benefits were not as
apparent to the early users. Therefore, they were hesitant to further utilize the systems.
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In order for these operator ports to successfully develop "one-stop shopping"
information solutions, they have to focus around the needs of all the potential
users/stakeholders, rather than simply satisfying government agency perceived needs.
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations
The focus of this thesis was on an approach taken by some ports to collect and
manage large amounts of cargo movement-related data (A separate approach would be to
communicate specific pieces of this data rather than to collect and manage it; please refer
to the thesis by Alexander Sichel on Supply Chain Security and Information Technology
for further information on this approach).
Summarizing the conclusions of the previous chapters, we have seen that ports
have been reluctant in spending any substantial amount of their own funds on improving
security measures beyond the minimum requirement by governmental authorities. This
has been primarily because ports are not convinced that if some of these measures are
implemented in certain ways, along with other changes in operations, they could be
offering better and more efficient services to carriers and shippers. The government has
tried to promote improvements with the C-TPAT initiative and Safe and Secure Trade
Lanes, such as the "green lane".
Some of the ports that have realized this, however, have gone beyond the basic
security measures and have taken a more proactive role in their operation practices, and
have decided to do more about data collection and tracking. Even in this case, however,
the pressure the government has been putting on these one-stop-shopping systems to be
developed quickly and with limited funding due to the 9/11 crisis, has resulted in these
systems focusing on the wrong issues (from the perspective of providing a service that
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stakeholders will pay for). They have focused on the security benefits, rather than on
creating efficiency and cost benefits for all stakeholders which would in turn result in
security enhancements.
A recurrent issue that has been found in each of the chapters concerning different
types of information being exchanged between stakeholders is the issue of data integrity.
GAO outlined problems on timeliness and completeness, even from government
agencies. Many documents that have to be prepared prior to a ship's arrival are also
dependent on the "goodwill" of commercial parties to provide accurate data, which is not
always the case. RISK Alert and FIRST have both had problems with ensuring that their
participants cooperate and send in the information needed. In these cases, if every
participant does not do his part properly and completely, the entire system ceases to work
properly. RISK Alert and FIRST have both shown that commercial stakeholders have
limited incentives to spend time and money on sending information that could damage
their entire business if it managed to leak out to the wrong hands. On the other hand,
eModal has focused on efficiency of operations since they did not have pressures from
the government and are a private firm. It seems that in some cases the government, by
trying to implement measures as soon as possible, managed to worsen the problem by
preventing the development of viable solutions.
Another major problem that has been shown in this paper is the many
stakeholders in the export and import process due to the large intermodal network
creating added complexities. The problem is that too many stakeholders have many
86
responsibilities, without a central coordinating member. This causes many inefficiencies
in the process, and also makes the tracking process of potential threats all the more
difficult. Data integrity issues are a problem in this case too, and because of this
dispersion of responsibilities and lack of a coordinating member, it is especially difficult
and unnecessarily time consuming to track where the inaccuracy originated from in order
to pin point the threat and prevent it on time.
Judging from the success of eModal and PORTNET, that were dedicated to
improving efficiency of the cargo flow, it is clear that similar future systems, or current
systems being revised and enhanced, should follow the same pattern. Security
improvements are bound to follow if all the participants in the system have a good
incentive to send timely and accurate data resulting in a better database. Federal agencies
should take this into account and not put as much pressure on the swift development of
programs that will only be shelved at the end. Rushing to fix the security shortcomings
that have existed for so long will not help. It is better to come up with a more thought out
and comprehensive solution and have the risk of problems continuing in the short run
while it is being designed and see very good long term results, than to come up with a
solution as soon as possible and end up having it not be as effective as possible in the
long term.
However, collecting data for these systems would be much simpler and faster if
there was a central coordinating member in the process of exporting or importing a
container, since fewer stakeholders would have to bother with spending time and money
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on this, making the benefits clearer. The ideal would be to give more responsibilities to a
particular party, such as freight forwarders in the example of Singapore, and have
information be sent back to them. This way the majority of information these systems
would come from one party and would be easier to manage and check for inaccuracies.
The IT systems that have been developed such as RISK Alert would have similar effects.
However, most of the systems have proven not to work due to commercial participant
unwillingness to fully participate and share their information. However, if these data
systems are designed to simply collect the information that is already exchanged between
stakeholders and shown in chapter 3, the potential results may not be as good, but they
may be far more feasible.
I also believe that US federal agencies should continue with initiatives such as
Safe and Secure Trade Lanes and the "green lane", etc. However, they have to make sure
that when they are offering preferential treatment through fewer customs inspections, that
they actually deliver what they say. A major rule in marketing is that any marketing
technique can only be successful as long as the product it is marketing lives up to the
promises being made. Up to now, the benefits have not been too visible, and commercial
participants are being discouraged from following these initiatives. The problem may also
be originating from the fact that these programs are at their infancy, and as they grow,
their benefits become clearer. Also, in the future, the government should examine the
funding related to the maritime supply chain, and should focus on improvements that help
prevent possible threats from ever entering the ports rather that keeping trespassers out of
the areas.
88
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
09/11
AAPA
AMS
ASI
ATTF
Biometrics
BoL
Cargo*Mate
CCTV
Consignee
C-TPAT
DRMEC
EDI
eDO
Refers to the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001
American Association of Port Authorities
Automated Manifest System: electronic cargo declaration
Americas Systems, Inc: designed and maintained the
RISK Alert website
Anti-Terrorist Task Force
Electronic ID cards for port workers
Bill of Lading: document required prior to arrival in port
A container chassis tracking system for the FIRST system
Closed Circuit Television: monitoring system for port
security
The buyer of the cargo
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Delaware River Maritime Enterprise Council
Electronic Data Interchange
Electronic Delivery Order: feature of eModal that allows
registered users to receive, track, and manage delivery
orders electronically
Electronic Inventory List
Electronic Interchange Reports
Data management system developed by private firm
Electronic Product Code
Federal Highway Administration
File Transfer Protocol
EIL
EIR
eModal
EPC
FHWA
FTP
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GAO
GPS
IMO
INS
Intermodal transportation
IT
Landlord port
LNG
NOA
Noon Position Report
Ocean Carrier
OPA 90
Operator port
PADCED
PANY/NJ
PORTNET
PRPA
PSA
RFID
RISK Alert
US Government Accountability Office
Global Positioning System
International Maritime Organization
US Immigration and Naturalization Services
The transportation of containers on two or more modes
(ship, rail, truck,
barge, air)
Information Technology
A port that is not involved in the actual Terminal
operations
Liquefied natural gas
Notice of Arrival: see VAN
Requirement of RISK Alert to provide information daily
on a vessel's position
A company that owns and operates ships
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, in the US, requiring double-
hull configuration for oil tankers
A port taking an active role in operations within the
Terminal
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic
Development
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Data management system developed by PSA
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority
Singapore Port Authority
Radio Frequency Identification
All-in-one data collection system by DRMEC
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Savi
SCAC
SEA LINK
Shipper
Smart Box
TEU
TSA
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)
US Coast Guard
US DHS
VAN
VLCC
Voyage Order
VTS
Logistics company providing military and commercial
users with container tracking and securing technology
Standard Carriers Alpha Codes: a unique two-to-four-
letter code used to identify transportation companies
Trucker identification system used in FIRST system
The firm sending/selling the cargo
Container with RFID technology developed by Savi
Twenty-foot equivalent unit: a standard for measuring
container capacity
Transportation Security Administration
A government organization that maintains control over the
importation and exportation of goods into the US
A government organization that, in part, enforces the
marine safety regulations of the US
Department of Homeland Security
Vessel Arrival Notice: a document used by the USCG 96
hours prior to the vessel's arrival into port
Very Large Crude Carrier
Is setup to receive basic information about shipments,
such as the bill of lading number, and allows someone to
uniquely identify the shipment, shipper, consignee,
product and quantity, and the origin and destination
Vessel Traffic Services are shore-side systems which
range from simple information messages to ships, such as
position of other traffic or meteorological warnings, to
management of traffic within a port or waterway
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